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ROBERT I. STARR*

The Potential for Joint Ventures
in Eastern Europe
My task this afternoon is to give an overview of the potential for "joint
ventures" in Eastern Europe. Joint ventures are the most advanced form of
East-West co-operation.
In general, the joint venture in Eastern Europe permits direct participation
by the Western company in marketing and other operations of the joint enterprise. This role can be more comprehensive than that which would be permitted
to the Western partner within the framework of a "co-operation agreement."
Western partners may prefer joint ventures over the more traditional forms of
co-operation for various reasons. One potentially important reason is
expectation of a greater measure of control over production than would be
possible through more traditional industrial co-operation links. A second
possible advantage would be a measure of control over management decisions,
thus allowing the Western partner more opportunity to protect his worldwide
investments and marketing networks. A third potential advantage of the joint
venture may be that it allows broader scope for profit-taking, sometimes with
lower effective taxes. Still another advantage is the opportunity to obtain direct,
first-hand know-how about marketing within Eastern Europe.
Certain Eastern European countries also believe, at least officially, that the
joint venture is more advantageous to them, in contrast to the more classical
forms of co-operation. Why?
In general, they feel the joint venture approach secures a greater commitment
by the Western partner to the success of the joint venture activity, and on a
continuing basis. Consequently, they believe they stand a much better chance of
having continuing access to the Western partner's technical and managerial
know-how. Other obvious potential benefits include the financial contribution
of the Western partner, and its assistance in obtaining additional financing
elsewhere. In practice, of course, the specific benefits of each case may vary.
So-called joint ventures are now permitted in Yugoslavia, and in two
COMECON countries, Romania and Hungary. Each of these countries has
enacted special legal provisions for this purpose. In all three countries, it is now
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possible to establish joint ventures that have legal characteristics similar to joint
ventures in market economy countries, with co-management, co-ownership of
capital, and sharing of profits and risks.
Parenthetically, let me note that the subject of our afternoon discussion is not
joint ventures with East European partners in third countries. I fully subscribe
to what has been said earlier today, about the possibilities for joint ventures with
Eastern partners in third markets. From the lawyer's point of view there is
nothing unique about such ventures. They might, for example, involve setting
up a joint company in a Western country, or in a developing country.
Yugoslavia, as you probably know, has for some years been moving in the
direction of a so-called "Socialist market economy." Through a series of laws
dating back to 1967, it has allowed foreign investment in Yugoslavia through
what are commonly called "joint ventures." By April 1975 about 110 joint
ventures had been registered, with total joint venture investment somewhere
near $800 million. Official statistics are not available since January 1974,
possibly because the Yugoslav government is concerned about the low level of
foreign investment. Western investment in these joint ventures has tended to
average about 17 percent of total equity, and much of this is often in the form of
capitalized know-how. Therefore, it seems that relatively little hard currency
has flowed into Yugoslavia through the joint ventures, though some very large
deals currently under discussion could change that picture.
Within the COMECON area joint ventures are permitted in only two
countries-Romania and Hungary. In Romania--despite considerable fanfare
and official enthusiasm-there have only been five joint ventures thus far: by
West German (1), Japanese (1), French (1), American (1) and Italian (1)
companies. Only two of these are operational. Both have had start-up problems.
It seems clear that the Romanian experience has not fully matched the high
early expectations, perhaps because of the complex questions involved in trying
to negotiate and operate a joint venture in that country. Thus far, the Romanian
joint venture legislation does not give promise of large scale Western investment
in that country.
The available evidence indicates that other East European countries have
come to appreciate the limitations of both the Yugoslav and Romanian models.
In the Yugoslav model, the joint venture operates essentially like other
Yugoslav enterprises, except that certain special rules apply to joint venture
enterprises, particularly with regard to taxation. This approach was made
possible because of the evolution of the Yugoslav economy to something
approaching a market economy setting, along Western lines.
By contrast, in the Romanian model joint ventures largely operate as
"enclaves," outside of the Romanian economy. They operate in an agreed hard
currency. This means that most purchases from Romania are in hard currency,
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at negotiated prices. Likewise, sales are normally in hard currency. Sales made
under Romania's bilateral clearing arrangements, to COMECON countries or
to third markets, do not give rise to hard currency for the purpose of remitting
profits to a Western partner.
In Hungary only two joint ventures have been concluded by the time of this
Institute. The first is with Sweden's Volvo, and the second with Siemens of West
Germany. Hungarian joint ventures are not permitted directly to engage in
productive operations or manufacturing. In Hungary the joint venture has a
more limited basis. It is contemplated mainly for trading, for product servicing,
and research and development. Therefore, many of the problems which might
arise in connection with Romanian or Yugoslav joint ventures are not
encountered, because of the limited role of joint ventures in Hungary.
Poland has had the question of joint venture legislation under study for some
time, and until about a year ago the Poles were saying that it was just a matter of
time until the legislation was actually enacted. But recent information indicates
that there will be no new joint venture legislation in Poland for the foreseeable
future. Poland claims that joint ventures are possible under the existing (preSocialist) legislation, but no Western company thus far has taken the "plunge"
and concluded a joint venture in Poland on that basis.
For the present, the Poles clearly seem to prefer their present policies, which
have led to some major projects involving Western partners. A good example is
the Massey Ferguson-Perkins deal, a $355 million industrial co-operation
project concluded last year.
Bulgaria seems also to have opted (for the present at least) for the industrial
co-operation model. New regulations issued in 1974 give the green light to
"industrial co-operation" with Western firms. These regulations even speak of
"profits" from co-operation programs; so there is, it seems, some recognition on
.the Bulgarian side of the need for greater flexibility, but clearly within the cooperation context rather than through joint ventures.
Czechoslovakia seems preoccupied with other concerns, and not interested in
permitting joint ventures at this stage. In fact, Czechoslovakia's record of
achievements in industrial co-operation with Western firms is very modest, so
joint ventures in Czechoslovakia may be a long way off.
East Germany has just begun to conclude industrial co-operation programs
with Western firms. For obvious reasons it is unlikely that the GDR will be in
the vanguard of East European countries breaking new ground in business
relations with the West.
That brings us to the Soviet Union. The Russians have been studying the
question of joint ventures for at least the past year. It is difficult to predict how
they will finally resolve the matter. This involves mainly practical issues-how to
permit "joint ventures" in the U.S.S.R. with Western firms, consistent with
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other Soviet policy objectives and the existing pattern of Soviet industrial
organization-particularly if the joint ventures would involve a substantial
management role for Western companies.
It is difficult to see how those practical issues will be resolved, but legally it is
very easy to imagine a scenario for resolving them on a "contract" basis, rather
than on a basis of "ownership" rights. No conflict with Soviet constitutional
rules need arise.
The texts of the various laws in the three countries that permit joint ventures
(Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary) differ in detail, but have much in common.
One common denominator is that the generation of hard currency earnings is an
important, if not indispensable, prerequisite to hard currency profit
remittances. Thus, a central issue in any joint venture negotiation in these
countries is to find a practical way to permit the joint venture to earn hard
currency.
Generally, this means that export markets must be anticipated. For many
Western companies, this often boils down to a need to find a product line which
will not be competitive with its existing plant capability elsewhere.
One fundamental difference between Yugoslavia on the one hand, and
Romania and Hungary on the other, is that in Yugoslavia the local partner is
not the state. The local partner in Yugoslavia is an enterprise that is sociallyowned and controlled by its employees. This has very significant legal and
practical consequences.
The Hungarian economy has evolved in a way that perhaps is closer to Yugoslavia than to Romania. Although the local partner in Hungary would be a
state-owned enterprise, as in Romania, it is likely that the personnel in
Hungarian enterprises might share the Western partner's outlook to a greater
degree than their counterparts in Romania.
In all three countries, the Western partner's equity share must, in practice,
be less than 50 percent. In theory, therefore, the Western partner does not have
voting control. However, in all three countries it is possible, through skillful
lawyering and negotiating, to provide mechanisms that ensure a substantial
measure of control in key areas, and prevent important decisions from being
taken without the consent of the Western partner.
It is also worth noting that although in theory the Western partner's right to
share in joint venture "profits" is normally limited to his share of equity capital,
there are other opportunities for realising effective profit-management fees,
royalty arrangements, pricing of supplies to the joint venture and pricing of
purchases from the joint venture, to name only a few obvious possibilities.
There are a number of other joint venture negotiation issues which we haven't
time to go into here, such as personnel matters, taxation, protection of
industrial property, customs, creditors' rights, reinvestment rules, reserve
funds, etc. Generally, such issues do not present insuperable barriers, provided
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that the business deal itself makes sense and that the parties have solved the
basic marketing question, i.e., assuring a source of hard currency earnings for
the joint venture.
Difficult practical problems also tend to crop up at the start-up/operational
stage. Even the most prescient and prudent Western company may fail to allow
for a sufficiently large margin of error. In Yugoslav joint ventures Western
partners have often made excessively optimistic calculations about such matters
as local costs, start-up time required, etc. Also, in some joint ventures in
Yugoslavia, Western partners have sought an "equal say" while taking only a
small (e.g., 15-20 percent) equity position. Naturally, such a situation can give rise
to problems.
Joint ventures can succeed in Yugoslavia, but this normally requires the full
efforts of both sides. There are some success stories, and there have been some
disappointments.
If my brief presentation has sounded a bit cautious today, it was out of a
desire to emphasize the importance of careful planning before getting too deeply
involved. In view of the unique features of these joint ventures, the interested
Western partner should make certain it has the benefit of informed advice as to
the technical, financial, commercial, legal and other aspects.
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